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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 12-4532 
_____________ 
  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
  
v. 
  
ALEXANDER PALMISANO, 
                           Appellant  
_____________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
OF THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. Cr. Action No. 12-cr-00325-1) 
District Judge: Honorable Harvey Bartle, III 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
January 17, 2014 
______________ 
 
Before: AMBRO, HARDIMAN, and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed: March 13, 2014) 
 
______________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 
 Appellant Alexander Palmisano (“Appellant”) appeals his Judgment of Conviction 
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for armed bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d).  Following his conviction, 
Appellant received a 108-month term of imprisonment, followed by a five-year term of 
supervised release, a $100 special assessment, and $1,000 fine.  Appellant contends that 
his sentence was substantively unreasonable because it varied thirty months above the 
high end of his guidelines range.  For the following reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s Judgment of Conviction.   
I.  Facts and Procedural History 
 Because we write primarily for the benefit of the parties, we recount only the facts 
essential to our discussion. 
 On March 1, 2012, Palmisano entered the Union Community Bank in Columbia, 
Pennsylvania, holding what appeared to be a black pistol, but was, in fact, an air pistol.  
Palmisano approached three bank tellers who were on duty that day, pointed the weapon 
directly at the tellers, and ordered them to put money into a plastic bag Palmisano 
provided.  Palmisano then fled the bank on foot with a total of $3,789.  One of the bank 
tellers notified the police, who, after a brief search, apprehended Palmisano, recovered 
the stolen bank money, and retrieved the black air pistol.   
 Palmisano was indicted in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on one count of 
armed bank robbery.  He later pled guilty to that count.  The District Court sentenced 
Palmisano to a 108-month term of imprisonment, a five-year term of supervised release, a 
$100 special assessment, and a $1,000 fine.   
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 The base offense level for the robbery was 20.  Palmisano was subject to a two-
level increase because the offense involved the property of a financial institution, and a 
three-level increase because he brandished a dangerous weapon during the robbery.  With 
a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, Appellant’s adjusted offense level 
was 22.   
 The Probation Office also considered Palmisano’s criminal history.  Palmisano 
had two prior convictions for bank robbery: he received three criminal history points for 
the first robbery offense, and one point for the second.
1
  Palmisano also had a 2003 
conviction for retail theft, which resulted in one criminal history point.  An additional two 
points were added because Palmisano was on parole at the time he committed the robbery 
in this case.   
 Taken together, Palmisano had a total of seven criminal history points, which 
placed him in criminal history category IV.  The total offense level of 22 and criminal 
history category of IV placed Palmisano in an advisory guideline range of 63 to 78 
months.   
 Palmisano argued at his sentencing hearing that a sentence within or below the 
advisory guideline range would be adequate, especially in light of the fact that he would 
serve additional jail time for his parole violation.  The government sought an upward 
                                                 
1
 On December 17, 2004, Palmisano was sentenced to a five to fifteen-year term of 
imprisonment for the two prior robberies, and was paroled on December 26, 2010 after 
serving approximately seven years of his sentence.   
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variance to a 120-month term of imprisonment.  The government argued that an upward 
variance was appropriate, citing the serious nature of the offense, the fear Palmisano 
instilled in the victim tellers, and his criminal history, including the fact that he 
committed the third robbery not long after his release from prison, while still on parole.  
The government also presented the testimony of two of the three victim tellers who 
recounted their belief that Palmisano had a real gun and would have hurt them if they had 
failed to comply with his demands.   
 The District Court adopted the guideline calculation, and, in considering the § 
3553(a) factors, concluded that the offense was extremely serious.  It noted that 
Palmisano had committed two prior armed bank robberies and had not been deterred 
from committing another.  As a result, the District Court sentenced Palmisano to a term 
of 108-months of imprisonment, which is thirty months above the guideline range.   
II.  Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).  We review the District Court’s 
sentencing decision under an abuse of discretion standard.  Rita v. United States, 551 
U.S. 338, 364 (2007) (citing United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 261 (2005)).   
III.  Legal Standard 
 We have held, in light of Booker, that a sentencing court must follow a three-step 
sequential process in determining an appropriate sentence.  United States v. Gunter, 462 
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F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir. 2006).  Courts must: (1) correctly calculate a defendant’s sentence 
under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines; (2) formally rule on the motions of both parties 
and state on the record whether they are granting a departure, how that departure affects 
the guidelines calculations, and take into account the Court’s pre-Booker case law, which 
continues to have advisory force; and (3) consider those arguments in light of the § 
3553(a) factors.  Id.  The sentencing court must provide an explanation for imposing a 
sentence that is sufficient to satisfy the appellate court that the district court considered 
the parties’ arguments, and had a reasoned basis for exercising its own decision-making 
authority.  Gunter, 462 F.3d at 247.  District courts have discretion when sentencing, and 
appellate review is limited to determining whether the sentence imposed is reasonable.  
 “The touchstone of ‘reasonableness’ is whether the record as a whole reflects 
rational and meaningful consideration of the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).”  
United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 571 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc); see also United States 
v. Levinson, 543 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir. 2008) (“Our responsibility on appellate review of 
a criminal sentence is limited yet important: we are to ensure that a substantively 
reasonable sentence has been imposed in a procedurally fair way.”).  “[I]f the sentence is 
outside the Guidelines range, the [appellate] court may not apply a presumption of 
reasonableness.”  Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).   
 “Our appellate review proceeds in two stages.”  United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 
558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009).  First, we ensure “that the district court committed no significant 
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procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines 
range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, 
selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the 
chosen sentence—including an explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range.”  
Id. (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 50).  If the district court’s procedure is satisfactory, we 
move to stage two and consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence.  Id. 
(citing Levinson, 543 F.3d at 195).   
 The substantive component requires the appellate court to take into consideration 
the totality of the circumstances.  United States v. Lychock, 578 F.3d 214, 217 (3d Cir. 
2009).  In looking at the totality of the circumstances, a sentence is substantively 
reasonable unless “no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same 
sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the district court provided.”  United 
States v. Friedman, 658 F.3d 342, 360 (3d Cir. 2011) (internal quotations omitted).  
Although the appellate court considers the extent of any variance from the advisory 
guidelines range, it must also give due deference to the district court’s decision that the § 
3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the variance.  Id.  The substantive 
reasonableness of each sentence must be evaluated on its own terms, based on the reasons 
that the district court provided, in light of the particular facts and circumstances of that 
case.  Tomko, 562 F.3d at 573.   
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IV. Analysis 
 Palmisano contends that the District Court’s sentence of 108 months’ 
imprisonment is substantively unreasonable.  He argues that the District Court failed to 
provide sufficient justification for imposing the thirty-month upward variance.   
 First, Palmisano argues that the District Court erred by relying on factors to justify 
the upward variance that were already accounted for in the guideline range.  Specifically, 
Palmisano argues that “the seriousness of the offense,” which the District Court relied 
upon in part to justify the upward variance, was already accounted for in his starting 
offense level of 20.  (Appellant Br. 18.)  Palmisano also contends that the three-level 
enhancement he received for brandishing a dangerous weapon incorporated the “harm of 
causing others to fear for their lives.”  Id.  Finally, Palmisano notes that the District 
Court’s assessment of his lack of deterrence from participating in armed robberies of 
banks was also already accounted for in the his criminal history category and associated 
points.   
 This argument is without merit.  While Palmisano is correct that some of the 
justifications for the upward variance were also used in calculating the guideline range, 
this does not amount to a substantively unreasonable sentence.  A court is not precluded 
from deviating from the guideline range on the basis of a particular factor simply because 
that fact was also considered in determining the guideline range.  See United States v. 
Greenidge, 495 F.3d 85, 103 (3d Cir. 2007) (“We emphasize that a sentencing court is 
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not prohibited from considering the factual basis underlying a defendant’s sentence 
enhancements, and indeed, should consider those facts in order to tailor the sentence to 
the defendant’s individual circumstances.”).  The District Court was statutorily 
empowered to consider Palmisano’s criminal history in the context of the § 3553(a) 
factors in determining to impose an upward variance, as well as in the guidelines 
calculation.   
 Palmisano also argues that the sentence was substantively unreasonable because it 
was “greater than necessary to achieve the purposes of § 3553(a) and failed to comply 
with the need to avoid unwarranted disparity.”  (Appellant Br. 21.)  The record, however, 
does not bear this out.  The District Court considered each of the § 3553(a) factors in 
order to fashion a sentence that was sufficient, but not greater than necessary to serve the 
goals of sentencing.  To that end, the District Court identified those factors that weighed 
in favor of leniency (i.e., Palmisano’s difficult childhood and family history), and those 
factors that weighed in favor of a longer sentence (i.e., the victims’ clear terror, the fact 
that Palmisano had not been deterred by the lengthy sentence he had received from the 
two prior armed bank robberies).  Given that the District Court did examine the totality of 
the circumstances in sentencing Palmisano, we cannot say that “no reasonable sentencing 
court would have imposed the same sentence on [him] for the reasons the district court 
provided.”  Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568.  Accordingly, Palmisano has failed to show that the 
sentence was substantively unreasonable.   
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IV. Conclusion 
 Given the facts and totality of the circumstances, the District Court’s 108-month 
sentence is substantively reasonable, and we will affirm.  
